of French sociologist Michel Crozier"s theory viewing France as a "stalled society" with a "stalled state" (Crozier, 1964; 1970) . However, lessons drawn from neo-institutionalist theories (insisting in the national specificity of reform trajectories due to institutional constraints and structuring historical patterns) invite us to more diverse kind of lenses to describe changes and suggest how framing the analysis in terms of inertia can be rather misleading. Indeed, the policies of administrative reforms have developed intensively in the French context as elsewhere, with specificities (Bezes, 2009; Bezes, Parrado, 2013) , that may be related to the kind and modes of changes occurring in a "Napoleonic" state (Ongaro, 2009) or as a Continental State (see Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2011) . The importance of gradual modes of changes or, at the opposite, upon long-term perspective in the context of resilient institutions have been emphasised for the French case (Bezes, 2009 ). Another argument is that New Public Management ideas did develop and diffuse in the French context but with specific institutional constraints (Rouban, 2008; Bezes, 2012) . At last, authors have also emphasized the specificities of ministries, some of them (Public Work, Health, Education) developing their own dynamic of administrative changes and their own accommodation of managerial tools (Jeannot, Guillemot, 2010; Guillemot, Jeannot, 2013) . With these perspectives in mind, this chapter offers interesting insights to emphasize how French top public officials perceive administrative reform policies in France in terms of trends, tools and scope.
The multiple nexus of the French political-administrative institutions
In order to provide a broad view of the French administrative institutions, four dimensions can be emphasized. The two first are related the degree of pervasivenessof the administrative system. The French state has been recognized as the archetype of a "unitary and centralized state" -a "Napoleonic state" -with strong national integration through a single territorial administrative structure (Crozier, Thoenig, 1975; Grémion, 1976) . And indeed, national ministerial administrations have subnational units representing subdivisions of the national ministries both at the regional and at the départemental levels. However, second, these regional and départementaldirectorates are also "supervised" by a "prefect" who is an agent of the whole government. These lines have designed a territorially based and vertically integrated administrative system, both from the ministerial point of view and from the more political one with the political control defended by prefects. The third component is the existence of a complex legal entrenchment, ranging from a strong legal body of provisions ruling bureaucratic life as well as a statute that organizes the professional life of all civil servants (statut general des fonctionnaires) (Dreyfus, 2000) . The French administration hasthus established a large and separate body of administrative law, consisting of a coherent legal doctrine that covered bureaucratic activities. The existence of this "rigid [legal] backbone" (Knill, 1999, p. 115 ) explains why any "new" types of ideas -such as the "new public management" movement" -have been filtered. The existence of specific training schools designed to train upper-level civil servants (at the top of them, the Ecolenationaled'administration, Eymeri, 2001 ) is another institutional related feature that even accentuated this trend (Bezes, Jeannot, 2011) . The fourth component concerns the political-administrative nexus and points to the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats "at the top". On the political side, the French Fifth Republic is often referred to as a semi-presidential regime. The hybrid nature of its politico-administrative system lies in the fact that, although its Constitution of the 4 th of October 1958 has established a parliamentary system, both the institutional practice and the constitutional reforms have increasingly strengthened the predominance of the President compared with the Prime Minister. The President was initially elected for seven years -while the members of the National Assembly"s term lasts five years -but the constitutional reform in 2000 has made the president and the deputies" term match; both now last five years, (theoretically) reducing the probability of "cohabitation" between a President originating from a different party than his or her Prime Minister. On the administrative side, by reinforcing the presidential and governmental executive against the Parliament, the Fifth Republic has given great strength to top civil servants and has designed fairly politicised minister/mandarin relations. On the one hand, the French administration relies on a vast majority of state civil servants who are recruited through competitive exams, trained in schools and promoted through rationalized mechanisms. The global image that results from these mechanisms is well known: a unified merit and career based civil service system, traditionally associated with the idea of a strong state tradition (État is always capitalised) and the idea of a disinterested civil servant serving the general interest and guarding the public good while also promoting the principles of impartiality, equality, adaptability and continuity. On the other hand, forms of politicization at the top have always persisted and have even been continuously and growingly used as structuring means for steering, producing loyalty and controlling administration at higher level through ministerial cabinets and discretionary appointments (political loyalty is there in balance with expertise and competences) (for an overview, Bezes and Le Lidec 2007) .
The trajectory of public administrative reforms in France
While administrative reforms did not play in France, in the eighties and nineties, the dominant role they had in Anglo-American and Antipodean countries and did not initially claim the same disruptive intentions at changing the very nature of the administrative system, administrative reform episodes in France have been numerous with a steadily growing influence of NPM devices from the nineties and more drastic reforms since the early 2000 (Bezes, 2009 (Le Lidec, 2001) . In this context, decentralisation has always been "the" major early "reactive" reform that induced reinforcing effects and changed the "Napoleonic" state , Bezes, Parrado, 2013 , for instance with a new decentralization Act in 2003-2004. In the eighties, smooth administrative reforms valued service quality, user concerns, some managerial techniques (evaluation, contracts) and a continuing set of distinctive public service orientations with strong participation of public servants and control through mutuality.
By the mid-1990s ideas, policy instruments, goals and the scope of reform were largely redesigned by the mid-1990s, to such an extent that the New Public Management "tool-kit" gradually became the dominant inspiration in administrative reform policies (Bezes, 2005; 2012) . At the same time, however, NPM ideas became more influent and growingly adopted by top bureaucrats from the French Grands corps through repeated state reform committees and reports (ibid.)
As a result of these ongoing processes unleashed in the 1990s, many comprehensive budgets, a new performance management system, a "real cost" approach to policy, aggregated headings, constraining capping tools for staff expenditure and a new accountability framework for Parliament) (Bezes, 2010; Corbett, 2010) . During the 1990s and early 2000s, the process of agencification was not absent in the French context but it was unsystematic and limited compared to other European countries (United Kingdom, the Netherlands) (Bezes, Fimreite, Le Lidec, Laegreid, 2013) . The creation of new autonomous public bodies dominantly took the legal form of the établissements publics, used since decades for many already existing autonomous public bodies (Conseild"Etat, 2012 (Bezes, Le Lidec, 2010; Poupeau, 2011) . First, boundaries between ministries were redrawn and the number of full ministers was significantly reduced leading to the creation of meta-ministries. Second, the territorial state administration was reorganized at the regional and the départemental levels through many mergers affecting nearly all state local units. Within the same General Review of Public policies, several austerity measures also affected the civil service (freeze on the point value of civil service pay from 2010, non replacement of one in two retiring civil servants).
The specificities of the major trendsofreforms: high on downsizing and mergers; low on transparency and citizen participation
As regards the big reform trends identified by the respondents in France (question 17), it is no surprise to find that the main responses describe the reforms of the last five years conducted under the general public policy review (RGPP) and reflect the sedimentary layers of previous reforms, which are perceived as less dominant and at work because a bit older.
80% of respondents (scale 1-3) 1 identify the impact of the "Public Sector Downsizing" measures: they correspond to the sustained policy of cutting public sector employment over this period by the non-replacement of one in two retiring civil servants.
This trend is specifically strong in the French context and is much above the COCOPS average (see table 1 ). This austerity trend is confirmed by the 69% that are opposed to the idea that there is and extending state provision into new areas, neatly beneath COCOPS average. The second item particularly identified was the policy of organizational merger cooperation between them. The reforms relating to performance targets and linked with the LOLF, first implemented in 2006 before the Sarkozy era, take a back seat. However, the respondents underline the importance of focusing on outcomes and results as broadly high at 50%. These measures, clearly dominated by the downsizing theme, which has the biggest psychological impact and affects organizations in their operation, are nevertheless not equated with market type reforms: this is evidenced by the mere 9 % of responses on the question of "privatization" and, to a lesser degree, for "flexible employment", external partnership and "contracting out", respectively 22 %, 30% and 33%. To a significant extent, 56% of the senior executives also identify the progress of digital government (or e-government) as broadly important, but also the creation of autonomous agencies (in France, taking the form of a growth in public establishments), which 38% of them see as broadly important. All in all, the assessments are uniform and broadly consider (scale 1-3) that the reforms are top-down (79%), substantive (i.e. drastic and very visible, 39%), little concerned with negotiation (contested by the unions 72%) and very much about cost-cutting and savings (68% versus 9.5% who consider them to be driven by quality improvement) and "driven by the crisis" (48% compared with planned for only 14 %).The pushiness of the recent reforms is 
Reforms by Instruments: the diffusion of managerial tools in the French context
Beyond the perception of the major reform trends, the assessment by senior civil servants of the instruments actually used in their parent organization is a good indicator of the changes underway in public administration and its intensity. In comparative perspective, the financial decisions and of staffing decisions (respectively 50% and 66% not present). In the French context, the "let the managers manage" slogan doesn"t seem to be really implemented.
The results also confirm well-known components of the traditional nature of personnel management rules in the French civil service and the highly controlled rules of recruitment and promotion. Accordingly, responses to questions on the quality of coordination clearly show the force of vertical, compartmentalized operation and fragmentation between ministries. Indeed, 87% of respondents to question 13 state that in the event of conflict between organizations, the usual preferred solution is to refer the problem up the hierarchy.
This approach is by far the most dominant. Next comesthe decision to shift the problem to the political level (61%) and the establishment of an ad hoc project group (48% of respondents).
Many mixed perceptions ofthe effects of administrative reforms
Compared to other top executives in other European countries, French top public officials are more critical about changes in the public sector. The general assessment of the global performance of the French public administration for the last five years (question 16) is marked bya significant negative bias. If we take a scale of 3, the negative views are predominant: 29% broadly worse vs. 16% broadly better. Generally speaking, all the judgments about performance vary according to the respondent"s level of responsibility, becoming more critical the further down the hierarchy we go. On specific items, the most favourable assessments, indicating an improvement, are few and relate to costs (54% on scale 3) and innovation (49%). This suggests a fairly restricted view of the improvements, since the first item reflects the numerous initiatives in the RGPP designed to cut spending, and the second refers to technological changes (e-government, Internet). By contrast, a large number of areas are perceived as having clearly declined. Certain perceptions of decline relate to the "external" effects arising from administrative action: the most remarkable (and the most worrying?) results in this sphere are that the senior executives surveyed consider that social cohesion has deteriorated (59% vs. 10%) along with citizen trust in government (59% vs.
10%). To a lesser degree, 45% of the respondents (vs. 23%) consider that citizen participation is also falling. The other clear perceptions of deterioration relate to the "internal" negative perception of the public sector and of the morale of its staff: 56% of respondents (vs.
19%) thus believe that staff motivation has deteriorated and 52% (vs. 21%) that the attractiveness of the public sector (i.e. of the government) as an employer has diminished.
These results indicate a certain malaise amongst French senior executives and the sense of a government that is enfeebled and out of touch. It seems a long time since administrative reform measures place the emphasis on participation by civil servants and users (Rocard reform of 1989 , Jeannot, 2003 Bezes, 2009 ) and the globally severe perception of reforms suggests a risk of reform fatigue from top executives coupled with the idea that reforms do not benefit to citizens as well as with negative side-effects on the place and role of the civil service in the French society.
Another major issue of concern is the variations in reform" perceptions across the 
